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Book Review 
rof. Bruno Dallago and Prof. John McGowan’s book studies the crisis in the 
European Union, particularly the Euro-zone, from the perspectives of the 
transatlantic relations. Their book is not a simple collection of papers or a 
normally edited monograph. It was the result of a series of significant transatlantic 
exchanges and collaborations, including two main conferences: one in Trento 
focused on Europe particularly the Eurozone, and the role of the US was seen 
fundamentally as an exogenous important factor; the second conference gave the 
central role to US and international organizations in dealing with the European 
crisis. By defining the factors leading to the European crisis, analyzing the 
potential risks accumulated through over-financialization and European integration, 
tracing the reasons why Eurozone countries cannot take counter cyclical policy 
measures to lift their economies out of recession. The book has provided a complex 
answer to the puzzling inability of the Eurozone in dealing with the crisis. The 
book has a lot of European experience worth the world to learn, particularly there 
is Enlightenment of European lessons to China.  
 
1. The factors leading to the European economic and 
financial crisis 
Along with the progress of globalization, the world mature and developed 
economies have more connections. The economies on both sides of the Atlantic 
have been deeply integrated both financially and productively; no one wondered 
that the onset of the Eurozone crisis was the outcome of transatlantic contagion 
(according to Bruno Dallago and John Mcgowan’s Introduction Chapter). The 
crisis started in the US when the housing bubble burst and was exported to the 
Eurozone through different channels. The sub-prime securities bubbles created by 
financial derivatives based on housing securities further stimulated financialization, 
for banks went to disperse the risk by means of derivatives. European banks held 
the US assets of derivatives of sub-prime securities, when the housing bubbles and 
sub-prime bubbles burst, derivatives rapidly lost value and the banks had 
derivatives in their portfolio went into distress. This financial crisis contaminated 
by the US, quickly leading to the difficulties in real economy in Europe, 
particularly in the Eurozone.  
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The great achievement by the end of last century was the creation of the Euro in 
Europe. The common currency and European integration has long been thought to 
give the economies of member countries greater resilience to crisis, it was mainly 
because the common currency could help Euro member countries resist the impact 
of the crisis. However, whenever the crisis being exported to European countries 
and contaminated the Euro countries, the reverse consequences occurred, there was 
no common Eurozone umbrella protected the more vulnerable economies 
(sovereign debts countries) (according to Steven S Rosefielde’s chapter). In fact, 
upon the ongoing 2008 financial crisis and economic recession, the Euro member 
countries failed in taking effective measures combating the crises. Normally, 
people understood that individual country employed currency depreciation and 
fiscal expansion in the effort of recovering growth of economy, i.e. counter cyclical 
policy measures, to compensate for the loss of social investment, and regain 
growth. However, the institutional architecture of the Eurozone removed the 
opportunities for the member countries to take currency depreciation for pursuing 
economic recovery. In addition, Eurozone public finances have been under extreme 
strain, the unusual deep fiscal austerity has been imposed in member countries in 
attempt to protect Euro (according to Daniel Quinn Mills’ chapter). Thus, member 
countries within the Eurozone had no chances to stimulate growth by fiscal 
expansion, the countries with the most vulnerable and weak economies in Europe 
had to cut the public expenditures for pursuing economic growth, but leading to 
even much serious problem of unemployment.  
Certainly, in the globalizing world, the common currency in the Eurozone, plus 
the fiscal coordination and economic integration in European community, this gave 
the countries of the European Union an unprecedented financial and economic 
stability and resilience to external crisis. That was why when the Latin American 
debt crisis happened in 1980s, the “lost decade” of the Japanese economy in 1990s, 
Mexico monetary and financial crisis happened in 1994, the Southeast Asia 
financial crisis happened in 1997, Russian financial crisis in 1998, and etc., overall, 
the European Union was only mildly influenced by the major crises that originated 
in the different parts of the world, during that period. For it has long been believed 
that an integrated member countries union can take concrete, better and stronger 
policy instruments to solve the problem, the 1990s and the first part of 2000s 
apparently supported this growing confidence and trend. But this time the crisis 
started in US and contaminated Eurozone, there was no room for national countries 
within Euro to take effective measures (counter cyclical policy measures) dealing 
with the crisis.  
 
2. Financialization accelerated the European integration 
but also accumulated potential risks 
Under the banner of globalization, the developed economies were deeply 
changing, and developing countries were also deeply influenced. One of the most 
important and visible trans-formations took place in production and trade. 
Industrial sectors were de-structured and the production of finished goods was 
replaced by the design, production and the assembly of components. This was 
made possible, among other things, by the microelectronic revolution that took 
place in the 1980s and the reorganization of the production process. Complex 
industrial products were the final result of the assembly of numerous components 
that were produced in different parts of the world, and the deeply development of 
financialization created this production mode of globalization. According to Ken 
Ash’s chapter, the main aspect of this production mode of globalization was/is 
Global Value Chains (GVCs). GVCs have become a dominant feature of world 
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trade and production, and investment banking business of import and export has 
been developing very fast, creating more derivatives of finance, creating huge 
risks. 
As a consequence, most countries’ productions have been engaged in the GVCs, 
significantly increasing the scale of globalization. The developed countries were 
certainly occupying the high ends of GVCs (Global Valve Chains), and developing 
countries had to stop at the lower end of GVCs or value chain links. Developed 
countries held financial advantages and technical progress, this contributed to the 
revival of western economies but not enough, for developing countries could also take 
advantage of technical progress, while benefiting from lower labor costs and less 
stringent labor and environmental standards. The real advantage the Western 
economies still possessed was in the financial field. The strong and rapid 
financialization of Western economies (Palley 2013) was the outcome of both the 
greater availability of financial wealth that could not find proper use in financing the 
real economy and the outcome of purposeful policies(according to Ken Ash’s chapter). 
Since most production process has been relocated in other places of developing 
countries in the world through assembly of component production system, besides 
some amount of financial wealth has been invested in developing countries aiding the 
GVCs production, the rest rich financial wealth makes a lot of financial innovation in 
developed countries through assets securitization. Over financialization in European 
society has become normal, and this has also seeded potential risks to the European 
economy, leading to today’s more severe Eurozone crisis.      
 
3. The reasons for in-effects of the Eurozone dealing with 
crises 
For some time, the euro area seemed to be safe from the 2008 crisis. However, 
after the crisis contaminated the Eurozone, it soon had the effect of revealing the 
structural weaknesses of the Eurozone construction. Particularly the contradicts of 
the weak EU common political strategy and common currency were the main 
reasons for why in-effects Eurozone dealing with the crisis.  
Common currency but no political unification in the Eurozone: While the EU 
member countries outside the Euro- zone could use the standard approach to 
recovery, including the depreciation of their currencies and bolder budget deficits, 
the Eurozone countries had to find a way to recovery. Maintaining a stable 
common currency was the top object in Eurozone, meanwhile the political 
unification in Eurozone or EU was not a concrete EU Government, it was unable to 
take a real European level policy action to against crisis. The weak political 
structure and common currency did not allow Eurozone take normal action for 
recovery, i.e. no chance for depreciation of currency and fiscal expansion in 
troubled countries (according to Simona Piattoni’ chapter). The common currency 
blocked the windows for Eurozone countries to use the exchange rate adjustment to 
lift the economy out of crisis. In the Eurozone, the only tendency was to tighten 
government budgets in difficult countries, and Brussels imposed strict rules for 
member countries to take measures cutting fiscal deficits, this would be of no 
helpful for those countries in crisis getting economic recovery.   
EU or Eurozone as a region of integration, it had done the job of weakening 
national sentiments and the opposition of national governments, and more or less 
created the European political system though it was not mature. Indeed, the not smooth 
way for the birth of EU Charter and its modifications, revealed that the nations of 
European Union did not really get any closer to a political unification. In this case, EU 
as an integration of nations, the regional integration strategy was to pursue the 
economic equilibrium both externally and internally. However, EU obtained a 
relatively external balance of economy, including a more or less balance of payment 
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and trade, but obvious intra-European imbalance. A situation similar to that between 
the United States on the one hand and China-Japan on the other has long been created 
in the Euro area, with Germany strongly in surplus and Spain-Ireland-Italy and France 
in deficit. Exchange rate adjustment was impossible since the common currency in 
Eurozone, the preferred course was to cut the public expenditure so as to reduce the 
external deficits in rainy countries. This made the employment situations be even 
worse in those rainy countries, exacerbated the financial crises and economic 
recessions in Europe.   
The rapidly spreading crisis required comprehensive policy action from Brussels. 
However, the weak political unification of EU was unable to response to the crisis 
quickly. Not like US employed the depreciation of dollar to restore its economic 
strength, the traditionally external depreciation of Euro was not used, for EU 
government did not have a national government authority to take action. While the US 
administration was fast and rather bold in acting, the Eurozone was caught in a near 
trance. There were alternatives, and in particular a common support of the ailing 
economies through either a lender of last resort—such as the European Central Bank 
(ECB)—or the mutualization of sovereign debt through Eurobonds (according to Paul 
Blokker’s chapter). However, the former was impossible because it was not part of the 
mandate of the ECB and economically stronger countries refused even to consider the 
possibility. For as the Euro member countries or EU member countries, individual 
country has her own claims, interests, and demands, it is difficult to reach a common 
policy anti crisis in some troubled nations, though it is much possible to reach a 
common wealth policy. The latter was adamantly refused by economically stronger 
countries resistant to being called to pay the bill of imprudent financial behavior in the 
vulnerable countries.  
On the contrary, Eurozone institutions were condemned to impotence and countries 
in difficulty had to go through austerity policies and internal devaluation. However, 
these policies made things even worse, since they could at best slow down the increase 
of the public debt, which in a period of crisis tends to increase due to the higher 
expenditures from automatic stabilizers at the same time that public revenue decreases. 
Austerity policies, and other attempts to lower public debt, have caused sizeable 
damages to the economy and caused major and prolonged falls in GDPs of the affected 
nations (according to Layna Mosley’s chapter). As a consequence, the Eurozone ratio 
of public debt over GDP could only worsen. This was the fundamental reason why it 
was in effects for Eurozone dealing with the crises. 
Fortunately, Jan.22, 2015, ECB’s Monetary Plicy Conference made the decision to 
introduce QE policy as a common action from EU level. ECB (European Central Bank) 
decided to buy 60 billion Euro bonds issued by Euro member countries per month, say 
from Mar. 2015 to Sept. 2016, raising inflation expectations and depreciating Euro, this 
is a counter cyclical policy measure, will undoubtedly lift the troubled countries of 
Euro members out of financial crisis and economic recession.  
 
4. The enlightenment of European lessons to China 
Compared to the Western societies fundamentally affected by 2008 financial crisis 
and economic recession, China’s financial sector had not been troubled directly during 
the difficult season. However, China’s real economy related sectors including the 
foreign trade production and social consumption had been severely hit. The tricks of 
this situation was that the Chinese financial market remained relatively closed and 
opaque, it also failed in making full use of global resources or claiming rights of asset 
pricing in the world market. In some sense the conservative and less developed 
financial market in China did block or delay the direct impacts of the world financial 
crisis on China’s economy.  
We are aware that without the support of innovative financial tools and instruments, 
China's export-oriented economy and local economic entities will be hard to move to 
the high end of GVCs. In order to enrich financial ecology and improve health of 
JEL, 2(2), Z. Wang, p.105-109. 
108 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics Library 
financialization, the authorities have to impose financial sector supervision and market 
regulation so as to guard against the financial risks. In the other hand, it also needs the 
support of good performance of real economy in return for improving financialization 
in China.   
The first point China should bear in the mind is to enhance the opening up 
development of China's financial industries. Over the past more than 30 years, China 
has attained rapid economic growth and has also made great achievement in financial 
sector. But in general, the Chinese financial market is in its initial stage of 
development, the scale of financial market is small, the structure of financial market is 
irrational. China is lacking of financial instruments and financial means, its financial 
market is still relatively closed. China's economy has been integrated into the 
globalization; it is the inevitably for Chinese financial industry to take the strategy of 
opening up development. The world financial crisis and economic recession will lead 
to the new international division of labor and the establishment of the new international 
order of economy and finance, so as to support the global investment and economic 
development of integration. The Chinese motivations of establishing Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, building the Silk Road economic belt and building 
maritime silk route, this would be certainly a great global development and 
governance. This measure would stimulate world economic growth and Asian 
integration, but will also create opportunities for the booming of Chinese finance, raise 
our voice in the world currency market and increase Chinese participation in the global 
pricing.   
What we should mention here is that China has to be aware of her booming of stock 
market during this special season with slow down of economic growth. The booming 
of security market and revitalizing real estate market will create more financial and 
economic bubbles, whenever the bubbles burst, it would be disaster of China’s 
economy and society far beyond China’s affordability.  
The second point China should bear in the mind is to improve China's financial 
supervision and financial legislation. Financial innovation is closely linked with the 
financial supervision; financial innovation is the key measure to promote the standards 
of financial services and efficiency of financial operation. Financial innovation in the 
past few decades in the west world, has greatly enhanced the market efficiency of the 
world's financial industries and promoted global financial reforms; but it has also 
brought about lots of troubles to the international financial market, challenging 
financial supervision, increasing the potential risks of finance and weakening the 
financial regulation, making the loss of efficiency of financial supervision. Drawing 
lessons from the Eurozone, China's financial industry should learn from the regulatory 
experience of the West, and standardize the structure of financial governance, enhance 
the risk control instead of strengthening the direct control. We should make efforts to 
stimulate financial innovation also greatly reduce financial risks, so as to support the 
long term sustained economic growth in China. 
Fortunately, European lessons mention that China has to bear in mind; the potential 
risks will be seeded in the process of financial innovation and over financialization. 
China has to impose concrete and strict financial supervision and improve financial 
legislation. 
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